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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
son for refusing to require a relationship between them. 4
This is an attempt to prevent a wrongdoer from having
actual immunity merely because the injured party is unable
to show that there was a measurable injury 15
Under the view of North Dakota, and the great weight
of authority, it is possible for the defendant to escape liabil-
ity when the plaintiff cannot prove an actual monetary loss.
It is submitted that this is-not the better rule to follow
DALE W MOENCH
ARMED SERVICES-DEFERMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS-
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS-C O N S T I T UTI O N A L I TY OF
"SUPREME BEING" REQUIREMENT-Convicted of failing to
submit to induction in the armed forces,1 the defendant
appealed, asserting he was improperly denied exemption as
a conscientious objector because his objections were not
dependent upon a belief in relation to a "Supreme Being",
as required by statute. 2  The defendant had declined to
assert a belief in a deity, but convinced authorities he held
a sincere religious faith in a purely ethical creed that pro-
hibited him from participating in any form of war Revers-
ing the trial court, the United States Court of Appeals, 2 Cir.,
held, that in the light of recent decisions by the Supreme
Court, a line such as is drawn by the "Supreme Being" re-
quirement between different forms of religious expression can-
14. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
15. See Reynolds v. Pegler, supra note 8, at 38, in which the Court said.
"Punitive or exemplary damages are intended to act as a deterrent upon the
libeler so that he will not repeat the offense, and to serve as a warning to
others. Punitive damages are allowed on the ground of public policy and
not because the plaintiff has suffered any monetary damages for which he is
entitled to reimbursement; the award goes to him simply because it is assessed
in his particular suit. The damages may be considered expressive of the com-
munity attitude towards one who willfully and wantonly causes hurt or injury
to another."
1. United States v. Seeger, 216 F Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
2. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 STAT. 604 (1948), 50
U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958). The act provides: "Nothing contained in this title
shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and
service who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously op-
posed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this
connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely per-
sonal moral code. "
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not be permitted to stand consistently with the First Amend-
ment or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
United States v Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir 1964), cert.
granted, 84 Sup. Ct. 1222 (1964) (No. 936)
In drafting the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,8
Congress liberalized the Selective Service Act of 1917, which
granted exemption only to members of a well organized
religious sect or organization with an established history of
pacifism.4 The 1940 act read: "Nothing contained in this
act shall be construed to require any person to be subject
to combatant training who, by reason of religious train-
ing and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form. 5
Based on dictum from a prior decision, 6 the clause was
interpreted to mean that opposition to war on humanitarian
and philosophical grounds was a "religious" belief.7 This
interpretation was rejected in 1946,8 leaving a conflict which
Congress resolved in the Universal Military Training and
Service Act of 1948 by again basing exemption for consci-
entious objectors on religious training and belief, but making
it dependent upon an individual's belief in relation to a
"Supreme Being" 9 The "Supreme Being" requirement was
upheld against constitutional challenges on several occasions. 10
The Court in the instant case was provided with a foun-
dation for its broadened definition of the word "religion"
by a 1961 ruling of the Supreme Court, in which the court
held, that a provision in the Maryland Constitution requiring
a declaration of belief in the existence of God in order for
an individual to qualify for the office of notary public in-
3. Ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 STAT. 889 (1940).
4. Ch. 15, § 4, 40 STAT. 78 (1917).
5. Supra note 3.
6. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
7. United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943),
United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944).
8. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 795 (1946).
9. Supra note 2.
10. Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. densed, 352 U.S.
882 (1956) , United States v. Bendick, 220 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955) , George v.
United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denwed, 344 U.S. 843 (1952).
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vaded the defendant's freedom of belief and religion. 1  In
effect, the Supreme Court ruled that any governmental
attempt to define the word "religion", as that word was
used in the First Amendment, would be unconstitutional if
the definition excluded any philosophical, sociological, poli-
tical or humanitarian belief which even the smallest min-
ority could call a "religious" belief. 1 2 Also, in deciding tax
cases, at least two courts have construed statutes providing
tax exemptions for "religious" organizations to include groups
possessing no theistic beliefs.1 3
Viewing the problem from a different vantage point, it
would seem that it is more difficult to exclude activities, nor-
mally considered to be religious, from the meaning of that
term, than it is to include beliefs not normally considered
to be religious in nature. 4
The instant case extends the position the Court took in
United States v Jakobson,15 which is factually similar and
which is also before the Supreme Court for review While
Jakobson recognized an ultimate creator of all existence,
which he termed "Godness," his concept of religion did not
fit within that of examining Selective Service officials or
the trial court. The appellate court dismissed the indict-
ment, noting that if the defendant were sincere "we rule it
an erroneous construction of the statute to conclude Jakob-
son's beliefs fell outside its definition of religion."' 16
The Court is unwilling to draw a distinction between
11. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). The Court stated "Neither
[state nor federal government] can constitutionally pass laws or impose re-
quirements which aid all religions as against nonbelivers, and neither can aid
those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs."
12. Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions A View in the Light of
Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEO. L.J. 252, 253 (1962-63).
13. Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C.
Cir. 1957) Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alemeda, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
The Court in the latter case, at p. 406, stated "Thus the only inquiry in such
a case is the objective one of whether or not the belief occupies the same place
in the lives of its holders that the orthodox beliefs occupy in the lives of be-
lieving majorities, and whether a given group that claims the exemption con-
ducts itself the way groups conceded to be religious conduct themselves. The
content of the belief, under such test, is not a matter of governmental concern."
14. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
15. United States V. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 84
Sup. Ct. 1222 (1964) (No. 937).
16. Id. at 412.
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Jakobson's devotion to a mystical force of "Godness" and
defendant Seeger's compulsion to follow the paths of
"goodness.' 7 Whereas, in the Jakobson case the Court
broadened its definition of "religion" so as to bring the
defendant's views within the meaning of the statute, in
the latest case the Court extended its definition so as to
make belief in a Supreme Being inapplicable as a test for
conscientious objectors.
One can envision a very real dilemma as a result of
the Court's decision. A virtual Pandora's Box may be open
to conscientious objectors-real or pseudo-whose "religious"
beliefs will exempt them from performance of duty to their
country If the Court's decision stands, where can Congress
draw the line? The "Supreme Being" test, though objec-
tionable, did provide a comparatively simple basis for de-
fining "religion." In view of the seemingly insoluble
question now posed, Congress may eventually have no choice
but to abolish the conscientious objector provision altogether
ROBERT WHEELER
17. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 853 (2d Cir. 1964).
1964]
